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Question of East Timor

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Progress report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. In 1982, by its resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem" with regard to East Timor. On the basis of that resolution, my two predecessors and I, over the past 17 years, have provided the good offices of the Secretary-General to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor. Through numerous progress reports, the Assembly has been kept abreast of those efforts.

II. Negotiations leading to the 5 May Agreements

2. At the time of the last report on the question of East Timor to the General Assembly (A/53/349), the tripartite negotiations process had begun to pick up pace. The talks were focused on finding an acceptable formula for wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor within the Republic of Indonesia, although there was no agreement as to whether such autonomy would constitute the final status of East Timor (as preferred by Indonesia) or an interim political arrangement pending a final decision by the East Timorese people as to the status of the Territory (as argued by Portugal and the East Timorese pro-independence leadership).

3. In October 1998, the United Nations presented to the Indonesian and Portuguese representatives a detailed draft constitutional framework for autonomy within Indonesia, which did not prejudge the shape of a final settlement. The document outlined and defined the various areas of authority and competence between an autonomous East Timorese administration and the Government of Indonesia. In November 1998, Indonesia and Portugal gave their responses to the proposals. Negotiations followed on all aspects of the document, through the tripartite Senior Officials Meeting process led by my Personal Representative, Jamsheed Marker. At the same time, the United Nations intensified its consultations with East Timorese leaders, including the President of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), Alexandre Xanana Gusmao, to whom the United Nations was allowed unimpeded access at his place of detention in Jakarta.

4. With these negotiations continuing to make substantive progress, a mutually acceptable autonomy plan began to take shape, although it was becoming increasingly pertinent to address the question of whether the proposed autonomy would constitute a final status for East Timor or an interim one pending an act of self-determination. On 27 January 1999, the President of the Republic of Indonesia announced that if the people of East Timor did not agree to be a part of

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Indonesia on the basis of the autonomy plan under negotiation, his Government would recommend to the new Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), scheduled to be installed after August 1999, that the law integrating East Timor with Indonesia should be rescinded. That declaration by President Habibie was an act of statesmanship of the highest order and had a decisive impact on the process of negotiations.

5. In introducing this so-called "second option" leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia, the Government ruled out the option of "transitional autonomy" whereby after an agreed period of autonomy East Timor would determine its final status. This represented a fundamental shift in Indonesia's position and offered a unique, historic opportunity to resolve the question of East Timor. However, that opportunity was to be contingent upon a very tight time-frame, given the Government of Indonesia's expressed imperative to present the decision of the East Timorese to MPR as soon as it was convened.

6. The new development significantly accelerated the pace of the negotiations. At a session of the Senior Officials Meeting convened in New York from 28 January to 5 February, the details of the proposed autonomy plan were discussed. Meetings were then held with Foreign Minister Gama of Portugal and Foreign Minister Alatas of Indonesia in New York on 7 and 8 February. The Ministers agreed that, when completed, the autonomy plan should be presented to the East Timorese people as an "end" and not an "interim" solution, and that a rejection of the proposal by the East Timorese people would represent a preference on their part to move towards independence. The method by which the East Timorese would be consulted was also discussed and it was decided that an appropriate method for putting the option to the population would be proposed by the Secretary-General.

7. At the following round of talks with the two Ministers on 10 and 11 March 1999 in New York, alternative methods for consulting the East Timorese on the autonomy offer were proposed by the Secretariat, with preference for a direct ballot in which all East Timorese of voting age would take part. The two Governments agreed on this ballot method, which would allow for all eligible East Timorese living in and outside East Timor to vote to accept or reject a permanent autonomy status with Indonesia. However, Foreign Minister Alatas informed the meeting that his Government had reservations about certain aspects of the autonomy plan and wished to revise the text to reflect the degree of autonomy which it was prepared to offer. Portugal did not object to such a revision of the autonomy draft by Indonesia, maintaining the position that the autonomy proposal was for Indonesia to offer, while the East Timorese should have the option of either accepting it or rejecting autonomy in favour of a transition to independence.

8. A Secretariat mission led by the Director of the Asia and the Pacific Division of the Department of Political Affairs visited Indonesia, East Timor, Australia, New Zealand and Portugal in March-April 1999 and carried out a preliminary assessment for a United Nations mission to conduct a popular consultation in East Timor, including extensive discussions with all East Timorese groups. The report of the mission served as a basis for the subsequent agreement on the modalities of consulting the East Timorese.

9. The final stages of the negotiations were reached at the 21 April session of the Senior Officials Meeting and my subsequent meetings on 22 and 23 April with Foreign Ministers Alatas and Gama. At that round of talks, a set of three agreements was finalized outlining a popular consultation process, by which the East Timorese people would be consulted as to whether they would accept or reject the special autonomy status proposed by Indonesia. The two Ministers then returned to their capitals to obtain the endorsement of their Governments. On 5 May 1999, at a historic ceremony in New York, the three agreements were signed: a main, overall Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Portugal on the question of East Timor, to which was annexed the constitutional framework for autonomy as revised and submitted by Indonesia, an agreement regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct, secret ballot, and a broad agreement on security arrangements. The latter two were signed by both parties and the Secretary-General. I presented the agreements to the Security Council as well as to the General Assembly in my report of 5 May 1999 (A/53/951-S/1999/513).

10. The General Assembly will recall that the main agreement (ibid., annex I) requested the Secretary-General to put the proposed constitutional framework to the East Timorese people for their acceptance or rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot. Article 5 of that agreement stipulated, *inter alia*, that in case of their acceptance, the Government of Indonesia would initiate the constitutional measures necessary to implement the autonomy framework, while the Government of Portugal would initiate the procedures necessary for the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Conversely, article 6 of the same agreement determined, *inter alia*, that if the East Timorese rejected the proposed autonomy, the Government of Indonesia would take the constitutional steps to terminate its links with East Timor, and the Governments of Indonesia

and Portugal and the Secretary-General would agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations, enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition to independence.

11. The agreement on security arrangements (ibid., annex III) gave to the appropriate Indonesian authorities the responsibility to ensure a secure environment devoid of violence and intimidation. This was defined as a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot. During the negotiations prior to the signing of that agreement, a number of recommendations were made to the parties regarding security. Those included the disarmament of all paramilitary groups and the withdrawal of some Indonesian forces from East Timor in the period leading up to the consultation. These proposals were rejected by Indonesia, which made it clear that it could not accept any dilution of its overall responsibility for security. The agreement also stressed that the absolute neutrality of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian police was essential in this regard.

12. The agreement on the modalities for the popular consultation (ibid., annex II) set 8 August 1999 as the date for the popular consultation. It also defined, *inter alia*, the questions which would be put to the voters to reject or accept the proposed autonomy, voter eligibility requirements and the schedule for the consultation process, and described each of the operational phases.

13. In the report of 5 May 1999 (A/53/951-S/1999/513) it was noted that the United Nations would face considerable logistical and other problems in carrying out the popular consultation within the short time-frame. The consultation was achieved with only a short postponement of the date of the ballot, and as the General Assembly is aware, the provisions of article 6 of the main agreement have since been met. However, the lack of adequate security had an adverse impact upon the implementation of the 5 May Agreements at every stage and culminated in the complete breakdown of security following the consultation itself.

III. Establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor

14. By its resolution 1236 (1999) of 7 May 1999, the Security Council welcomed the 5 May Agreements and my intention to establish a United Nations presence in East Timor and requested me to provide detailed modalities for the conduct of the popular consultation and the establishment of the mission. Accordingly, in my 22 May 1999 report to the Council (S/1999/595), the establishment of a United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), to organize and conduct the popular consultation was proposed. UNAMET was to include political, electoral, information, civilian police and military liaison components.

15. While these proposals were under consideration, United Nations staff were already on the ground conducting assessments and planning for the implementation phase. This allowed for a speedy establishment of the Mission once its mandate was provided. Ian Martin was appointed my Special Representative for the East Timor popular consultation on 21 May 1999. On 11 June, UNAMET was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1246 (1999).

16. UNAMET became operational at a very rapid pace. On 12 June, the Civilian Police Commissioner arrived in Dili and began working with an advance team of United Nations civilian police. By 15 June, four of the eight regional electoral offices of UNAMET were operational, and the Chief Electoral Officer had arrived to lead a core electoral team already in place. By the end of June, the Chief Military Liaison Officer had arrived in East Timor. The public information campaign was established early on and agreements were reached with local media providers to carry information messages. The texts of the main agreements and autonomy proposals were translated and disseminated. The logistical requirements of the Mission were also assisted by the local authorities, who provided excellent premises for its headquarters. Most importantly, the active support of Member States, including in-kind contributions of vehicles and helicopter transport and early donations to a dedicated trust fund, gave the mission critical capacities at an early stage.

IV. Establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission

17. In order to ensure complete transparency of the consultation process and provide an independent body for the adjudication of complaints from any quarter, an Independent Electoral Commission, responsible for the overall assessment of the consultation process, was constituted. The Commission consisted of three eminent jurists with extensive experience in the field of electoral processes: Patrick Bradley (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and Ireland), Johann Kriegler (South Africa) and Bong-Scuk Sohn (Republic of Korea). The Commission directly observed the entire consultation process, from the registration to the counting of votes, and certified the results.

V. Security concerns

18. A climate of relative political openness had begun to flourish in East Timor after the change of government in Jakarta in May 1998. Pro-independence activists had responded by increasing their activities, in some cases beyond the bounds of normal political activity. In January and February 1999, large groups of pro-integration militias were organized. In the weeks and months following the Government's announcement that it would allow for East Timor's potential separation from Indonesia, a number of militia groups intimidated pro-independence figures and local populations as a whole in an apparent bid to influence the outcome of the impending consultation process. In a wave of violence carried out in Dili and other towns on and around 17 April 1999, numerous people were killed and all forms of open advocacy of independence were suppressed. CNRT ceased to operate openly and pro-independence figures who had escaped the violence went into hiding or in a few prominent cases sought protection with the police. On 20 April, the Defence Minister and Armed Forces Chief, General Wiranto, visited Dili. Agreement was reached to establish a Commission on Peace and Stability, including leaders of both pro-integration and pro-independence viewpoints. During the negotiations leading to the 5 May Agreements, my Personal Representative had recommended to the parties the establishment of a peace commission with United Nations involvement. Unfortunately, however, the United Nations was not included in the Commission on Peace and Stability, which never became fully operational.

19. With the deployment of UNAMET, security conditions in the cities of Dili and Baucau improved, as it did in some eastern districts. However, from their very first visits to various regions of East Timor, United Nations personnel reported that a climate of fear and intimidation pervaded much of daily life in many areas outside Dili. Pro-integration militias carried out acts of violence and exercised an intimidating influence over the population, especially in the west, with impunity. Pro-independence supporters were not able to work openly. The Commission on Peace and Stability did not succeed in elaborating a code of conduct on the laying down of arms and disarmament, as envisaged in the agreement on security arrangements. Tens of thousands of people were internally displaced as a result of militia operations and local NGOs, church organizations and other humanitarian organizations were unable to deliver assistance owing to the militia threat. These security concerns were highlighted in both written and oral reports to the Security Council.

20. These activities had a severely constricting effect on political freedom, jeopardizing the openness necessary for the implementation of the consultation process. The General Assembly will recall that under the agreement regarding security arrangements (A/53/951-S/1999/513, annex III) I was called upon to ascertain, prior to the start of the registration and based upon the objective evaluation of the United Nations mission, that the necessary security situation existed for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process. The main elements that would need to be in place in order for me to make such a determination were outlined in paragraph 6 of my 5 May report (A/53/951-S/1999/513).

VI. Delays of the operational phases of the consultation

21. These elements were not in place by 22 June 1999, the date when the registration was originally scheduled to begin. Nor were the logistical preparations in place to begin registration in all areas simultaneously, a necessity to allow all East Timorese an equal opportunity to register. Therefore my assessment was postponed for three weeks, setting 13 July as the new target date for the commencement of registration, to give UNAMET time to fully prepare and the authorities an opportunity to take measures to improve the security conditions. However, during this three-week delay, serious incidents against UNAMET occurred. On 29 June, the UNAMET office in Maliana town, Bobonara regency, was attacked by a crowd of pro-integration supporters, including some 100 militia, who threw large rocks at the office. On 30 June, militia forced the withdrawal of electoral staff from Viqueque after levelling direct threats at UNAMET officers, and on 4 July a convoy of vehicles returning from a humanitarian mission, accompanied by members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNAMET, was attacked by a militia group near the town of Liquica.

22. My Personal Representative, Mr. Marker, my Special Representative, Mr. Martin, and other senior officials met extensively with the Government of Indonesia during the latter part of June and July to address the situation. UNAMET, for its part, withdrew some staff from its regional offices only when necessary and resumed operations as soon as possible after each incident. In response to each of the above attacks, the Government of Indonesia undertook to do its utmost to address the situation. However, while I did not doubt the Government's sincerity and intention to support the consultation process, which it had itself initiated, it was clear that the situation on t[illegible]round departed markedly from

the policy espoused by the Government. Thus, on 10 July, although UNAMET had completed all necessary preparations for registration, the President of the Security Council was informed that the security situation in East Timor as a whole, and especially in the western districts of the Territory, remained serious. The Government of Indonesia indicated its intent to send a Cabinet-level mission to Dili. In order to allow for concrete steps to follow that visit, the start of registration was scheduled for 16 July, pending concrete improvement in the security situation.

23. Alongside the consultation process itself, efforts to achieve reconciliation among East Timorese leaders had also progressed. From 25 to 30 June, the Dare II conference was held in Jakarta under the auspices of the Bishops of Dili and Baucau. The conference brought together important leaders from inside and outside East Timor, including Mr. Gusmao and pro-autonomy leaders, and ended with the issuance of a series of "points of convergence", which, though not addressing sufficiently the issue of the laying down of arms, included the agreement by all participants to accept the outcome of the ballot.

24. The 5 May Agreements did not give the United Nations any direct mandate to ensure security, but they did provide my office with the discretionary power to decide at any point whether to halt the process or to move forward to the next stage. The prospect of achieving greater security through delaying the process, or indeed halting it, had to be weighed carefully against the risk of depriving the people of East Timor of the historic opportunity afforded by the Agreements. It was by no means certain that, should the timetable shift by too great a margin, the consultation would be held at all.

25. Based upon a careful weighing of the various countervailing considerations outlined above, the registration process was begun on 16 July, although, in a 14 July letter to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/788), it was noted that all the necessary conditions did not exist for the peaceful implementation of the popular consultation process throughout the Territory. The delays to the start of registration required that the date of the ballot itself be postponed to 30 August. The decision to begin the registration was also taken based upon the positive assurances of the Indonesian authorities, and on the condition that meaningful, visible improvements in the security situation would occur during the registration, with a further assessment to be made halfway through the period.

VII. Registration

26. The registration process itself was in general unimpeded by violence. The registration proved to be a marked success, with 446,666 people in total registered, 433,576 in East Timor and the remainder at international registration sites. This massive turnout demonstrated the deep desire of the East Timorese people to take part in the popular consultation. It also pointed towards the success of UNAMET's efforts to inform the voters of the process and its confidentiality. Throughout the registration and later during the polling, UNAMET's electoral team built into the process numerous safeguards to protect the voters while maximizing participation. Following requests from the Government of Indonesia and some political groups, a 2-day extension of the 20-day registration period in East Timor and a 4-day extension was approved outside the Territory to ensure that no eligible voters were left out. Towards the end of the registration, the flow of applicants progressively diminished, a clear indication that the process had fully served the population. The three-member Independent Electoral Commission duly reviewed the registration process and certified it as a legitimate basis for the conduct of the consultation.

27. During the registration period such activity declined noticeably, particularly with regard to attacks and threats against UNAMET staff, who were if anything more vulnerable in the widespread registration deployment. Some arrests were made in relation to the militia attack on the Liquica convoy, but the fundamental problem of impunity remained. The authorities and pro-integration groups also lodged complaints regarding alleged abuses by the pro-independence Falintil forces. However, investigations by UNAMET found that Falintil largely followed a low-profile strategy of self-cantonment without overt operations, whereas UNAMET, as well as numerous other credible observers, reported that the pro-integration militias continued to receive support, tacit and direct, from elements of TNI and the Indonesian police.

VIII. The campaign period

28. The general pattern during the campaign period was one of an encouraging degree of cooperation between the political leadership of the pro-independence and pro-autonomy camps, often marred by violent resistance by the militias to pro-independence campaigning and organization. A draft code of conduct for the political campaign, prepared by the United Nations, was successfully negotiated and

agreed to on 9 August by the two contending sides. The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) represented the coalition of pro-independence groups, while the groups supporting autonomy formed the Front Bersama Pro-Otonomi Timor-Timor (UNIF) immediately prior to the campaign period. Regional campaign committees were established to serve as a forum for inter-party campaign conflict resolution, coordination of campaign events, discussion of campaign issues and management of complaints. Thus, the campaign events themselves were relatively peaceful, except for the last day of the campaign, when violence erupted in Dili. The political environment surrounding the campaign, though, was far from calm. While security conditions varied in different regions, there was widespread intimidation of pro-independence activists.

29. As was the case earlier in the process, the resurgence in militia violence stood in contrast to a degree of progress in reconciliation efforts among the East Timorese political leadership. On 11 and 22 August, the United Nations convened meetings in Jakarta at which East Timorese leaders took encouraging steps towards reconciliation. Agreement was reached among the East Timorese leadership to form an East Timorese Consultative Commission appointed by myself and comprising equal representation of pro-independence and pro-autonomy groups, to provide a forum for East Timorese participation in the post-ballot arrangements. Also in August, Senior Officials Meetings were held in Jakarta and Lisbon to discuss preparations for the post-ballot period. Indonesia and Portugal took a very constructive approach to discussing and preparing for either outcome to the ballot, building upon a mutually acceptable plan for the post-ballot interim phase which had been presented to the Security Council on 9 August (S/1999/862).

IX. The polling

30. On polling day, 30 August 1999, fully 98.6 per cent of all those registered, some 446,953 East Timorese, cast their ballots within and outside the Territory. For the most part, any fears of a large-scale disruption of the vote were not realized. There were a few security incidents throughout the day, but they were quickly dealt with and voting resumed. However, this general calm was broken by the deplorable murders of two local UNAMET staff members in Atsabe, Ermera District, on polling day, a cause for great outrage.

31. The counting of the ballots was conducted centrally, in Dili, in order to ensure secrecy as to local voting patterns. The count was completed early on 4 September. As was reported to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 344,580, or 78.5 per cent voted to reject, and 94,388, or 21.5 per cent, voted to accept the proposed special autonomy. Despite the security challenges, the process as a whole succeeded in guaranteeing transparency while protecting the secrecy of the ballot, allowing UNAMET to conclude the consultation without any fundamental threats to its integrity. The unequivocal result, certified by the Independent Electoral Commission following a judicial review of a number of protests and alleged irregularities, provided the basis for a clear resolution of the question of East Timor on the basis of the 5 May Agreements. In its determination of the results, the Commission stated that "the popular consultation had been procedurally fair and in accordance with the New York Agreements, and consequently provided an accurate reflection of the will of the people of East Timor."

X. Post-consultation violence

32. Following ballot day the security situation in East Timor deteriorated, and after the announcement of the results there was an eruption of violence, as has been well documented. Pro-integration militias conducted organized, coordinated operations through population centres, ransacking towns and forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of East Timorese to the hinterlands and to West Timor. There were consistent reports, from United Nations staff, credible international observer groups and the media, of the direct involvement of TNI and police personnel in this campaign. UNAMET was forced to evacuate all of its offices except for Dili headquarters, where the remaining staff were besieged along with some 2,000 East Timorese who had taken refuge there. I communicated frequently with the President of Indonesia to discuss the necessity of bringing the situation under control as soon as possible. I also consulted with many other heads of State and Government, who provided their assistance in a concerted effort to resolve the crisis. On 6 September, President Habibie announced that martial law would be instituted in East Timor. I communicated to him my position that, unless this were to quickly result in a restoration of law and order, the Government of Indonesia should invite the assistance of the international community to resolve what had rapidly become a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions.

33. That same day, the Security Council decided to dispatch a mission to Indonesia to relay its concerns to the Government. The mission was led by the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations and

included the Permanent Representatives of Malaysia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Netherlands and my Deputy Personal Representative for East Timor. The mission held meetings with the President, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defence, as well as Madame Megawati Sukarnoputri, Mr. Gusmao of CNRT, members of civil society, the diplomatic corps and United Nations staff. It also visited Dili on 11 September. In New York, 52 Member States participated in an open Security Council debate held to address the situation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the region from 10 to 13 September to assess the human rights situation.

34. On 12 September, the President of Indonesia informed me and the Security Council mission that he was inviting an international peacekeeping force to cooperate with Indonesia in restoring peace and security in East Timor. As the mission noted in its report (S/1999/976), martial law had not succeeded in resolving the situation. The mission stated that the involvement of large elements of the Indonesian military and police in East Timor in organizing and backing the militia had become clear to any objective observer. It further concluded that the authorities were either unable or unwilling to provide the proper environment for the peaceful implementation of the 5 May Agreements. Thus, the decision of the Government of Indonesia to invite an international force was to be welcomed.

XI. Establishment of the multinational force

35. The Security Council, in its resolution 1264 (1999) of 15 September 1999, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorized the establishment of a multinational force empowered to use all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor. Following consultations, facilitated by the Secretariat, between Australia and Indonesia in New York, and the Commanders of the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET) and TNI in Dili, the Australia-led force began deployment on 20 September and moved quickly to establish itself. INTERFET would go on to comprise forces from 22 Member States. Cooperation between INTERFET and TNI, at times facilitated by UNAMET, was generally good. UNAMET had maintained a skeleton team in Dili after the bulk of its staff were withdrawn, along with over 1,400 internally displaced persons, from the compound to Darwin, Australia, on 14 September. UNAMET began to redeploy with the support of INTERFET, although the process was hindered by the fact most UNAMET facilities, and indeed much of the infrastructure of East Timor, had been heavily damaged or destroyed.

36. In a report to the Security Council of 4 October 1999 (S/1999/1024), it was noted that TNI had reduced its strength to around 1,200 personnel, limited to the Dili area. Military and police personnel had withdrawn from the rest of the Territory. INTERFET proceeded to establish security progressively throughout East Timor, while also supporting the humanitarian operations. A Humanitarian Coordinator for the East Timor crisis was appointed on 11 September and he worked with humanitarian relief partners and INTERFET to provide relief support to the internally displaced populations, which gradually began to return to those areas secured by INTERFET.

37. In the wake of the post-ballot violence, the civil administration in East Timor was no longer functioning, the judiciary and court systems had ceased to exist and essential services were on the brink of collapse. At a 28 September tripartite meeting with Foreign Minister Alatas of Indonesia and Foreign Minister Gama of Portugal, it was agreed that ad hoc measures were required to fill the gap created by the early departure of Indonesian civil authorities. On 4 October, a report was submitted to the Security Council proposing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), to be endowed with the overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority (S/1999/1024). Pending its establishment, urgent measures were taken to address the vacuum left in civil administration, legal and judicial systems, and law and order, using the available assets of INTERFET and United Nations personnel on the ground.

38. Meanwhile, the situation of the refugees in West Timor became a matter of great concern. Over 200,000 had fled or been forcibly deported and many remained under the control of the pro-integration militias. Agreement was reached between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Government of Indonesia to ensure access to the refugees and also to ensure that those wishing to return were free to do so, but militia activity remained a problem on the ground.

XII. Establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

39. Early on 20 October, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) met in plenary to take up the issue of the East Timor popular consultation. MPR recognized the result of the consultation and revoked the law integrating East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. On 25 October, the newly elected President of Indonesia wrote to me to convey the decision of MPR. By that letter, and my reply, the arrangement for the transfer of authority over East Timor to the United Nations referred to in article 6 of the main 5 May agreement (A/53/951-S/1999/513, annex I) was effected. The Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) along the lines proposed in my report of 4 October 1999.

40. Sergio Vieira de Mello was appointed my Special Representative and Transitional Administrator for East Timor and he assumed his post on 16 November. UNTAET is proceeding to implement its broad mandate. The challenges facing the operation are myriad given the destruction wrought in East Timor. In its transition to independence, the Territory will require the assistance of the international community as a whole. An inter-agency humanitarian appeal has been prepared to meet short-term relief and rehabilitation requirements, while an assessment mission led by the World Bank has reported on longer-term development needs. The United Nations will present, with the Bank, a consolidated appeal for all requirements to donors at a conference to be held in Tokyo on 15 and 16 December.

41. A top priority of UNTAET is the establishment of close consultation and liaison with the East Timorese. Working with Alexandre Gusmao of CNRT and other East Timorese leaders, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has reached agreement on a National Consultative Commission. UNTAET will ensure that through this consultative mechanism, and by close liaison throughout all sectors of the administration, the needs and wishes of the East Timorese people are fully represented in the implementation of the transitional administration. UNTAET will keep Member States informed of its work through periodic reports to the Security Council.

42. Accounting for the violations of human rights which occurred in the aftermath of the consultation process is vital to ensure a lasting resolution of the conflict and the establishment of the rule of law in East Timor. Three special rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights visited the region in early November and their joint report is to be submitted to the General Assembly. A United Nations commission of inquiry, established by the Economic and Social Council on 15 November, has begun its investigations in East Timor. Its report will be submitted by 31 December and will be made available to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. An Indonesian commission of inquiry has also visited the region. Those responsible for grave violations of human rights in East Timor must be held accountable for their actions.

43. Another pressing requirement will be the establishment of good relations between East Timor and its neighbours, including Indonesia and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This process is under way, as shown by a recent visit by Mr. Gusmao to Jakarta and visits by senior CNRT officials to the region. While East Timor is relatively stable at present, its rehabilitation and development will also depend upon the return and rehabilitation of displaced communities.

44. The swift resolution of the refugee situation in West Timor will be a priority in the immediate future. To date, over 100,000 refugees have returned from West Timor and internally displaced persons are re-establishing their communities. In the months ahead, the multinational force will be replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping force with strong regional representation. UNTAET will proceed to establish its administrative capacity throughout all sectors of governance and administration, and in all areas of East Timor. All the refugees in West Timor who wish to return must be allowed to do so freely.

XIII. Observations

45. It is my privilege to report to the General Assembly at its current session the successful culmination of the long and arduous tripartite negotiations, conducted under my auspices with the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and in consultation with East Timorese representatives. This process has led to the settlement of the question of the future status of East Timor, based upon the freely expressed wishes of the people of East Timor. My gratitude goes to the Assembly and the international community at large for the support extended to my predecessors and myself in the search for a resolution of the question of East Timor, and for the steadfast support of the international community throughout the consultation process. I also thank the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal as well as the

representatives of the East Timorese people for their cooperation and political will, which made this outcome possible. I wish to express my deep appreciation for the skill and dedication of my Personal Representative, Jamsheed Marker, and the tireless work of his team in conducting the negotiations and diplomatic process that have led to this accomplishment.

46. I wish to also pay tribute to my Special Representative, Ian Martin, and the staff of UNAMET for their courageous professionalism in implementing the 5 May Agreements. It is a matter of outrage and regret for me that the consultation process was marred by widespread violence, wanton destruction and a massive displacement of the population organized and perpetrated by elements that opposed East Timor's independence. My condolences go especially to the families of the five local UNAMET staff members who were killed in the post-ballot violence. Two others remain missing.

47. I congratulate the people of East Timor for the new page they have turned in their history and for the perseverance and courage they have shown, particularly in the face of the large-scale intimidation and violence that characterized the decisive final stages of the process. Without their determination, the successful conclusion of this process would not have been possible. The United Nations will do its utmost to fulfil their trust with respect to all aspects of the work which lies ahead during the transition of East Timor to independence.

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Agenda item 43
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 2 December 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the civilian inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place in October 1999.

1 October 1999

Between 0400 and 0610 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Bayyadah and Amiriyah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 1155 hours the Lahad proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the easternmost section of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and its Manzilah neighbourhood from the Burj hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions.

At 1540 hours the Iqlim al-Tuffah heights at Mlita and Luwayzah and areas along the Zahrani River came under intermittent Israeli artillery fire.

Between 1725 and 1805 hours occupying Israeli forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of miscellaneous-weapons fire at outlying areas of Bayt Lif, areas along the Tasah spring, outlying areas of Jarju', the area around Sujud hill and Mazra'at Uqmata from the Jabal Hamid, Zafatah, Sujud hill and Rayhan positions. The collaborators' militia also fired a shell at an outlying area between Rumin and Sarba from the Sujud position.

2 October 1999

At intervals between 0100 and 0400 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at al-Hamra (south-east of Luwayzah), Sujud hill and Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Shurayfah hill and Zaghlah positions.

At intervals between 0500 and 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 1045 hours the proxy militia fired some 15 12.7-mm rounds at the Army's Mlikh post (NT-1) from the Sujud hill position. The walls of the post were damaged.

Between 1645 and 1835 hours occupation forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Mayfadun, Yatar, Mazra'at Uqmata and the area around the Sala'ah position from the Tall Ya'qub, Zafatah, Rayhan, Sala'ah and Qusayr positions.

At 1655 hours areas along the Zahrani River, Jabal al-Rafi' and the area around Sujud came under Israeli artillery and heavy machine-gun fire from Zafatah and the Israeli position at Sujud.

At 1730 hours the Asi area came under Israeli artillery fire from the positions on Hardhun hill.

Between 1755 and 1930 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. Between 1800 and 1823 hours they attacked the area around Mazra'at Uqmata, the outskirts of Mazra'at al-Hamra and outlying areas of Frun in three waves, firing five air-to-surface missiles.

At 2130 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired an 81-mm mortar shell into the area near its position in the Kafr Hunah triangle.

At 2210 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

3 October 1999

Occupying Israeli forces arrested Khadijah Muhammad Mansur, a schoolteacher and the wife of the detainee Muhammad Abd al-Hasan Surur, and took her to the Khiyam detention centre.

At various times between 0000 and 0700 hours occupying Israeli forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Majdal Silm and Jba' from the Rayhan, Aramta, Zafatah, Tayyibah, Tall al-Ibad, Sujud hill and Tahrah hill positions.

Between 0500 and 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0700 hours the collaborators' militia fired five 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Abu Qamhah position.

At 1200 hours occupying Israeli forces fired five 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Haddatha and Sribbin from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1340 hours the Shabraq area between Haddatha and Rshaf came under fire from the occupation forces' position at Rshaf.

At 1555 hours Israeli occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1710 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Yatar - the Rayahin station - firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1815 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at Uqmata and outlying areas of Jba' from its position at Rayhan.

At 1840 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Jba', firing an air-to-surface missile.

4 October 1999

At 1325 hours the collaborators' militia at the Zimriya position directed bursts of 12.7-mm fire at the area around the crossing.

At 1330 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Marj al-Zuhur, Mimis and Jabal Bir al-Dahr at very high altitudes.

At 1540 hours parts of Sujud and Jabal al-Rafi' and areas along the Zahrani River came under artillery fire accompanied by bursts of machine-gun fire.

At 1545 hours the proxy militia and occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at Uqmata, south-east of Luwayzah, and at areas around Sujud hill from the Rayhan and Shurayfah positions.

At 1620 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah at low altitudes.

At 1645 hours Israeli warplanes overflew areas of the Western Bekaa opposite the occupied strip.

At 1745 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired three 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Qusayr from the Sala'ah position.

Between 1940 and 2000 hours an Israeli gunboat off the Qulaylah lowland fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 2010 hours Israeli helicopters overflew Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort), Ayshiyah and Rayhan before leaving in the direction of the occupied strip.

At 2220 hours the proxy militia fired two 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha from Shal'abun hill, north-west of Bint Jubayl.

5 October 1999

At 0030 hours Israeli occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Kafur from the Shurayfah position.

At 0120 and 0140 hours Israeli warplanes attacked Wadi al-Kafur, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

Between 0435 and 0535 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi Habbush and the area around Suwayda hill from the Shurayfah hill position.

At intervals between 0500 and 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Amiriyah and Bayyadah fired several bursts of miscellaneous-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0730 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haddatha, Haris, Ayta al-Sha'b and Bra'shit from the positions at Ba'lul hill (south of Bra'shit), Shaqif al-Naml, Bayt Yahun and Ruways.

At 1020 and 1225 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all areas of Lebanon at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1120 and 1125 hours an Israeli helicopter fired three air-to-surface missiles, two at outlying areas of Qabrikha and one at the eastern outskirts of the town. The latter missile hit an empty dwelling and the occupied dwelling belonging to Husayn Ibrahim Mansur (mother's name Ilham and born in 1974).

At 1130 hours occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 1200 hours the occupation forces' artillery bombarded the outskirts of Jumayjimah with 155-mm artillery shells from the Muhaysib area in the occupied border strip. There was also an overflight by an MK drone reconnaissance aircraft.

Between 1300 and 1330 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 10 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint

Between 1300 and 1400 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah, Jibal al-Butm, Yatar and Jba' from the Tall Ya'qub and Rayhan positions.

Between 1420 and 1615 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. Between 1505 and 1530 hours they attacked outlying areas of Jibal

al-Butm, Zibqin and Shu'aytiyah in three waves, firing nine air-to-surface missiles.

Between 1515 and 1550 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several artillery shells, 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds at outlying areas of Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar (Ayn al-Shamaliyah), Jba', areas along the Tasah spring and areas around Bi'r Kilab from the Rayhan, Bi'r Kilab and Zafatah positions.

Between 1550 and 1600 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at areas along the Zahrani River towards outlying areas of Habbush and at Mazra'at Uqmata and the area around Sujud hill from the Zafatah position.

Between 1720 and 1855 hours Israeli occupation forces fired 14 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah and Jibal al-Butm from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1815 and 1855 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Yatar, Jibal al-Butm and Shu'aytah, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

At 1845 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired an 81-mm mortar shell at the outskirts of the Dayr neighbourhood in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa from the Ali al-Tahir hill position. Two dwellings, those belonging to Yusuf Mataniyus Rashid and Ilyas Mataniyus Rashid, were hit by several pieces of shrapnel.

Between 1905 and 2230 hours occupying Israeli forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Majdal Zun and Zibqin and at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Tall Ya'qub, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and Zafatah.

At 2140 hours the Luwayzah, Mlita and Jabal al-Rafi' heights came under intermittent Israeli artillery fire from the positions opposite.

At 2145 hours occupying Israeli forces shelled the Asi area between Kafra and Yatar from their positions in the border strip.

At 2200 hours the Wadi al-Qaysiyah area between Majdal Silm and Khirbat Silm came under Israeli 155-mm artillery fire from the Muhaybib position, and occupation forces launched six illumination flares over an outlying area of Shab'a from their positions in the occupied strip.

Between 2215 and 2300 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. Between 2230 and 2250 hours they attacked Mlita hill, outlying areas of Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar in four waves, firing four air-to-surface missiles. The side road between Jarju' and Humin al-Fawqa was cut by a pile of rocks and earth, and an electricity transformer in Jarju' was set on fire.

Between 2230 and 2240 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa at low altitudes.

Between 2245 and 2345 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of the Maslakh neighbourhood in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa from the positions at Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort), Dabshah hill and Tahrah hill.

Between 2330 and 2350 hours Israeli occupation forces fired 16 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Siddiqin and Shu'aytiyah from the Tall Ya'qub position.

6 October 1999

Between 0020 and 0030 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Shu'aytiyah in two waves, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

At various times between 0030 and 0700 hours Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Zibqin, Jibal al-Butm, Majdal Zun and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the Tall Ya'qub, Mays al-Jabal, Jabal Balat, Dabshah hill, Tahrah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions.

Between 0500 and 0615 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. At 0545 hours they attacked Mlita hill in three waves, firing five air-to-surface missiles. One dwelling was hit and totally destroyed.

At 0700 hours a position of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon manned by members of the Finnish contingent received a direct hit in the shelling of the Frun area by occupying Israeli forces.

At 0705 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired three 120-mm mortar shells at the outskirts of Frun from the Sala'ah position. The home of Ahmad Muhammad Ammash was hit by several pieces of shrapnel, and he and his son Husayn were wounded. The homes of Mahmud Husayn Ammasha and Fatimah Ali Ja'far were also hit.

Between 1100 and 1300 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South and the Shuf at very high altitudes.

At 1150 hours occupying Israeli forces fired several 120-mm mortar shells at areas along the Tasah spring from the Ksarat al-Urush position.

Between 1315 and 1515 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Rafi' and the area around Sujud hill from the Zafatah and Ksarat al-Urush positions.

At 1350 hours Israeli occupation forces fired seven 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1600 and 2030 hours occupying forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Rafi' and Mazra'at Uqmata from the Zafatah and Ksarat al-Urush positions.

At 2050 hours Israeli occupation forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At intervals between 2050 and 2225 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Tyre and Ra's al-Ayn fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

7 October 1999

At 0600 hours occupying Israeli forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 0625 and 0645 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0635 and 0645 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. They attacked Wadi al-Qaysiyah in two waves, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

At 0935 hours the Lahad proxy militia directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at Kafr Tibnit from the position at Ali al-Tahir hill. A vehicle was hit and the town's electricity and telephone lines were damaged.

Between 1230 and 1250 hours the proxy militia fired five 120-mm mortar shells at areas along the Litani River and Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Abu Qamhah position.

At 1315 hours the proxy militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at al-Hamra from the Zafatah position.

Between 1315 and 1420 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells, 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Mazra'at Buyut al-Siyad, Mazra'at Uqmata, Jabal al-Rafi' and areas around Sujud hill from the Bayyadah, Hardhun, Tall Ya'qub, Zafatah, Rayhan and Shurayfah positions.

Between 1410 and 1500 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. At 1450 hours they attacked the Ayn al-Shamaliyah area, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

At 1750 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1840 and 1900 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel and occupation forces directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Yuhmur al-Shaqif and Mansuri and at Mazra'at Buyut al-Siyad from the positions at Bayyadah and Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort).

At 1945 hours an Israeli gunboat off Ra's al-Ayn fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions and launched an illumination flare over the sea.

Between 2050 and 2130 hours occupying Israeli forces and the proxy militia fired several 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit and at the Army barracks from the Burj hill, Ali al-Tahir hill, Zafatah and Dabshah hill positions. Serious damage was done to the electricity lines, and supply to the town was cut off. Two occupied dwellings (owned by Ali Hasan Ayyub and Muhammad Hasan Ali), one shop (owned by Abd Ali Ibrahim) and four vehicles were also damaged.

At 2215 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Jba' from the Zafatah and Rayhan positions.

Between 2250 and 2330 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes. At 2325 hours they attacked outlying areas of Jba', firing an air-to-surface missile.

8 October 1999

At 0635 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired seven 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun and Mansuri from the Shama' position.

At 1025 hours Israeli forces shelled upper Kafr Tibnit, where there were a number of reporters being shown the scale of the damage that had been caused. A car belonging to the reporter Dani Nur al-Din was hit in the shelling.

At 1950 hours occupation forces directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi Mimis from the Ayn Qinya and Zimriya positions.

At 2015 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Zibqin from the Tall Ya'qub position.

9 October 1999

Between 0000 and 0020 hours occupation forces fired nine 175-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Zibqin, Izziyah and Junayh from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1100 hours the collaborators' militia shelled the area around Mansuri from the Hardhun and Bayyadah positions.

At 1120 hours the main street of Mansurah came under Israeli artillery fire from the Hardhun and Bayyadah positions.

At 1145 hours Israeli forces bombarded the western part of Yatar with 155-mm artillery shells from the Balat position.

At 1525 hours occupying Israeli forces directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi al-Fatir from the Ayn Qinya position.

Between 1540 and 1730 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at Uqmata, the

area around Sujud hill, areas along the Tasah spring and outlying areas of Jba' from the Shurayfah hill and Rayhan positions.

Between 1730 and 1745 hours occupying Israeli forces and the proxy militia fired several direct-fire 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at areas around Sujud hill and outlying areas of Jba' from the Rayhan, Zafatah and Shurayfah hill positions.

Between 2210 and 2220 hours occupation forces fired several 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Jba' from the Ksarat al-Urush and Rayhan positions.

10 October 1999

Between 0210 and 0550 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Mimis ridge from the Zaghlah, Ayn Qinya and Zimriya positions.

Between 0610 and 0710 hours the proxy militia and occupation forces fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi Habbush, outlying areas of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Mazra'at al-Hamra, areas along the Litani River and the area around Sala'ah and Suwayda hill from the positions at Sala'ah, Suwayda hill and Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort).

At 0625 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Kafra from the Rshaf position.

Between 0910 and 1030 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired four 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah and a 120-mm mortar shell at Mazra'at Uqmata and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Tiri from the positions at Rayhan, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and Ruwaysat al-Jamus.

Between 1125 and 1200 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Western Bekaa and the South at very high altitudes.

At 1240 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit from the Ali al-Tahir position.

At 1330 hours Israeli occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1530 and 1555 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

At 1635 hours occupation forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at Sujud hill from the Shurayfah position.

At 2055 hours the collaborators' militia fired three 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi Habbush from the Zafatah position.

At 1900 hours a patrol of the proxy militia's security service arrested Army Master Sergeant Hani Abu Dahn in the town square in Hasbayya and took him to the Marj Uyun barracks.

11 October 1999

Between 0000 and 0425 hours occupation forces on Dabshah hill fired three 81-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around the hill itself.

At 0820 hours occupying Israeli forces at the Zimriya crossing directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around the crossing itself.

Between 1055 and 1155 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired five 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and seven direct-fire rounds and directed several bursts of miscellaneous automatic-weapons fire at the outskirts of Mansuri, Majdal Zun and Mazra'at Buyut al-Siyad from the Shama', Tall Ya'qub, Bayyadah and Hardhun positions. In Majdal Zun a civilian vehicle was hit a 12.7-mm round. In Mansuri an occupied dwelling belonging to Hasan Ali Khashshab was hit. A shell impacted in Bayyadah, damaging an occupied dwelling belonging to Salim Alyan and three other dwellings belonging to the Alyan family, one of them identified as that of Amir Alyan.

Between 1145 and 1205 hours Israeli occupation forces directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Mimis ridge, areas around the Zimriya crossing and Zuhur road from the Zimriya hill position.

Between 1820 and 1830 hours two Israeli helicopters overflew the Ayn Qinya and Ahmadiyah positions.

12 October 1999

Between 0200 and 0530 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Mimis ridge, Jabal al-Dahr and areas along the Litani River from the positions at Zimriya hill, Zaghlah hill and Ahmadiyah hill.

At 0635 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas Bra'shit, Haddatha and Haris from the Ba'lul, Jabal Hamid and Ruways positions.

At 0840 hours occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas Zibqin and Majdal Zun from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 0845 hours occupation forces fired 32 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin, Shu'aytah and Hinniyah from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1035 and 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre and Tibnin areas. At 1040 and 1045 hours they attacked outlying areas of Zibqin, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

Between 1135 and 1300 hours Israeli occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal al-Rafi' and outlying areas of Shu'aytiyah, Izziyah, Jibal al-Butm and Wadi Habbush from the Tall Ya'qub and Zafatah positions.

Between 1405 and 1410 hours occupying Israeli forces fired five 120-mm mortar shells at Wadi Zillaya from the Abu Qamhah position.

Between 1455 and 1510 hours an Israeli MK drone reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Jabal Bir al-Dahr area.

Between 1620 and 1700 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

Between 1820 and 1940 hours occupation forces fired 56 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Izziyah, Yatar, Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin and Shu'aytiyah from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1900 and 2030 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. At 1930 and 2020 hours they attacked outlying areas of Shu'aytiyah and Jibal al-Butm in four waves, firing several air-to-surface missiles. In Jibal al-Butm the shelling and the air raid damaged two occupied dwellings (those of Mustafa Muhammad Khalil and Hasan Mihanna Mihanna) and three empty dwellings.

At 1900 hours two Israeli helicopters fired three air-to-surface missiles at outlying areas of Shihin and Zibqin.

Between 1910 and 2040 hours occupying Israeli forces fired three 120-mm mortar shells and 20 155-mm artillery shells at areas around Sujud hill and outlying areas of Zibqin and Shihin from the Tall Ya'qub and Ksarat al-Urush positions.

Between 1925 and 1950 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Jabal Bir al-Dahr at very high altitudes.

Between 2100 and 2230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Tyre and Tibnin at very high altitudes.

At 2240 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Kafra and Yatar at medium altitudes. There was also an overflight by an MK drone reconnaissance aircraft.

13 October 1999

Between 0300 and 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0630 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Frun, firing an air-to-surface missile.

Between 0630 and 0700 hours the collaborators' militia and Israeli occupation forces fired six 155-mm artillery shells and three 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas Majdal Zun,

Mansuri and Izziyah from the Shama', Hardhun hill and Tall Ya'qub positions. In Majdal Zun four occupied dwellings were hit, namely those of Muhammad Salih Salman, Radi Darwish Murad, Rida Ali Sulayman and Hasan Khalil Shahimi.

Between 0710 and 0730 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

At 0750 hours the proxy militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at areas around the Habbush bridge and outlying areas of Arabsalim from the Zafatah position. Electricity lines were badly damaged and supply to Arabsalim and Jarju' was disrupted.

At 1235 and 1355 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Western Bekaa and Mount Lebanon at various altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

At 1840 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1850 and 1910 hours the collaborators' militia at the Ahmadiyah hill position fired a 120-mm mortar shell and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas along the Litani River and areas around the position itself.

At 1955 hours Israeli warplanes attacked areas along the Litani River west of Zillaya, firing three air-to-surface missiles. At 2020 and 2040 hours this was repeated.

Between 2045 and 2200 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

Between 2140 and 2200 hours Israeli warplanes attacked areas along the Litani River in four waves, firing four air-to-surface missiles.

<u>14 October 1999</u>

At 0000 hours occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jba' from the Shurayfah hill position.

Between 0015 and 0720 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Sujud hill, outlying areas of Jba' and Wadi Kafra from the Shurayfah position.

At 0730 hours the Lahad proxy militia at the Sala'ah position fired four direct-fire rounds at the road leading to the position itself.

At 0940 hours Israeli helicopters overflew areas along the Hasbani River and Hasbayya town at low altitudes.

At 1045 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at high altitudes.

Between 1145 and 1215 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the outskirts of Luwayzah and Mazra'at Uqmata from the Zafatah position. In Luwayzah a vehicle was damaged.

Between 1200 and 1310 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

At 1330 hours Israeli forces fired five 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Abu Qamhah position.

Between 1800 and 1840 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired 15 155-mm artillery shells and two direct-fire rounds and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Qabrikha, Jibal al-Butm, Yatar, Siddiqin, Shu'aytiyah, Rishknaniyah and Zibqin and at areas around the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah from the Tall Ya'qub and Dabshah hill positions.

Between 1800 and 2030 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes. Between 1910 and 1925 hours they attacked outlying areas of Zibqin and areas along the Tasah spring in three waves, firing five air-to-surface missiles. In Zibqin occupied dwellings belonging to the following persons were damaged: Yusuf Muhammad Bazi', Muhammad Husayn Bazi', Intizah Abd al-Ra'uf Bazi' and Ahmad and Jamil Mihanna. Cracks appeared in the structure of several other dwellings. The infant daughter of Yusuf Bazi' was injured.

At 1900 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Habbush-Arabsalim road from the Suwayda hill position.

At 2040 hours the collaborators' militia fired three direct-fire rounds at areas around the Shaqif al-Naml position from the Ruwaysat al-Jamus position.

At 2110 hours Israeli occupation forces and the Lahad militia collaborating with them fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at Uqmata and areas around Sujud hill from the Zafatah and Ksarat al-Urush positions.

15 October 1999

Between 0300 and 0400 hours occupation forces fired 35 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal al-Khalawat and six at the Mimis ridge from the Abu Qamhah position.

At 0620 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0845 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 1105 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Khalawat from the Abu Qamhah and Zaghlah positions.

At 1150 and 1215 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at the Jabal al-Khalawat ridge from the Zaghlah position and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the same ridge from the Shwayya position. At the same time, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Western Bekaa area.

At 1215 hours occupying Israeli forces fired two direct-fire rounds at Jabal al-Khalawat from the Shwayya position.

At 1500 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the area between Luwayzah and Uqmata in the Iqlim al-Tuffah area.

At 2040 hours occupation forces fired several 81-mm mortar shells at the area around Ali al-Tahir hill from the Dabshah hill position. They also fired several 120-mm mortar shells at the area around Sujud hill from the Ksarat al-Urush position.

Between 2100 and 2215 hours the collaborators' militia directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the Mimis ridge from the Zimriya position.

Between 2325 and 2340 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal Safi, the area around Sujud hill and outlying areas of Jba' from the Shurayfah hill position.

16 October 1999

Between 0500 and 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0530 hours Israeli occupation forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Haris from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 0645 hours occupation forces fired 17 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Zibqin, Yatar and Jibal al-Butm from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 0700 and 0750 hours occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar and the area around Sujud hill from the Tall Ya'qub and Shurayfah positions. A 120-mm mortar shell from an unknown source impacted in Rayhan near the home of Emil Nayif Tamir and the walls were damaged by shrapnel.

Between 1825 and 1940 hours the proxy militia fired 11 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Bra'shit from the Ba'lul hill and Saff al-Hawwa' positions.

17 October 1999

Between 0150 and 0355 hours occupying Israeli forces fired 13 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Jibal al-Butm and Zibqin from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 1110 and 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

Between 1115 and 1130 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 1200 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Bekaa area at very high altitudes.

Between 1425 and 1720 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around Sujud hill, Dabshah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill from the Shurayfah, Ksarat al-Urush, Dabshah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions.

Between 2015 and 2125 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired five 155-mm artillery shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Bra'shit and the area around Rajmin hill from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Ba'lul hill and on Rajmin hill itself.

Between 2200 and 2220 hours the proxy militia and occupying Israeli forces fired a number of rocket-assisted projectiles and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas near and outside the westernmost neighbourhood of Yuhmur. The supply of electricity to the town and its immediate vicinity was disrupted. In the neighbourhood itself a garden wall and a water tank were damaged.

At 2340 hours occupation forces fired a number of artillery shells at the outskirts of Majdal Silm and at Wadi al-Saluqi from the Hula position.

18 October 1999

Between 0000 and 0235 hours occupying Israeli forces and the Lahad militia collaborating with them fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haddatha, Kafra, Bra'shit, Shaqra and Tibnin from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Bayt Yahun, Ruways and Ba'lul. Two members of the Resistance were hit by several pieces of shrapnel.

Between 0430 and 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Beginning at 0645 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the southern suburbs of Beirut on two occasions at high altitudes.

Between 1925 and 2010 hours several 120-mm mortar shells fired from the occupied strip fell in the area around Sujud hill.

Between 2040 and 2300 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Mount Lebanon and the South at very high altitudes.

At 2045 hours occupation forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

19 October 1999

At 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0600 and 0630 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah and at areas around Tahrah hill and Dabshah hill from the Zafatah position and from the positions on the hills themselves.

At 0635 hours occupation forces at the Tahrah position fired three artillery shells and directed sniper fire at areas around the position itself.

At intervals between 1045 and 1135 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South and the Western Bekaa at various altitudes.

Between 1100 and 1430 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the North, the Western Bekaa and Mount Lebanon at various altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1750 and 1940 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

At 1910 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Mazra'at al-Hamra from the Zafatah position.

Between 2005 and 2030 hours occupation forces fired nine 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 2330 and 2400 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

20 October 1999

At 0000 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired several 120-mm mortar shells and four 155-mm artillery shells at Kafra and Yatar from the Ruways hill and Tall Ya'qub positions.

Between 0030 and 0600 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and a number of 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Haddatha, Bayt Yahun and Rshaf from the Ruways, Shaqif al-Naml and Tall Ya'qub positions.

Between 0500 and 0600 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Mansuri and Rashidiyah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0040 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the outskirts of Jarju' and Jba' from the Rayhan and Sujud hill positions.

Between 0500 and 0535 hours the proxy militia directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at Qab' al-Dallafah and Wadi al-Fatir from the Ahmadiyah and Zimriya positions.

At 0640 hours the collaborators' militia on Tahrah hill and Suwayda hill fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around its positions.

Between 0845 and 0855 hours the proxy militia fired eight 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Khalawat from the Zaghlah hill position.

At 0900 hours occupying Israeli forces fired a 120-mm mortar shell at Jabal Shwayya, in the Mimis direction, from the Abu Qamhah position.

Between 1145 and 1200 hours occupation forces fired seven 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Zaghlah hill position.

At 1230 hours the collaborators' militia fired three 60-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Kafr Rumman from the Tahrah hill position.

Between 1300 and 1320 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the coastal area of the Shuf at very high altitudes.

Between 1305 and 1400 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes.

At 1630 hours the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the area around Sujud hill from the Zafatah position.

Between 1720 and 2000 hours the collaborators' militia fired four 155-mm artillery shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Jabal al-Rafi' and the area around Ba'lul hill from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and on the hill itself.

Between 1825 and 1845 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells and six 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Bra'shit and Jabal Za'tar from the positions at Ba'lul hill and the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint. The electricity lines were damaged and supply to the town was disrupted.

Between 2030 and 2055 hours two Israeli helicopters overflew Ahmadiyah hill, Kawkaba and Hasbayya. At the same time occupation forces fired several 120-mm mortar shells at the outskirts of Nabi Sujud and outlying areas of Jba' from the Ksarat al-Urush position.

Between 2230 and 2300 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre and Tibnin areas at very high altitudes

Between 2230 and 2300 hours occupation forces fired 14 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jba' from the Shurayfah position.

Between 2325 and 2355 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes.

21 October 1999

At 0635 hours the collaborators' militia at the Ba'lul hill, Shaqif al-Naml and Ruways positions and occupying Israeli forces at the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Bra'shit, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Haris, Sribbin and Yatar. In Bra'shit electricity lines were damaged and a number of dwellings, some of them occupied, were hit by shrapnel. The dwellings belonged to the following persons: Muhammad Kamma Talib Farhat, Rida Abd Haydar Shihab, Mustafa Muhammad Dahir, Husayn Talib Farhat, Nahlan Hasan Farhat, Juliette Hasan Farhat, Hafiz Abd al-Hadi al-Hadi, Kamil Husayn Muzhir, Ali Hasan al-Hadi, Hasan Adnan Farhat and Muhammad Ali Husayn.

At 0645 hours occupation forces bombarded the area around their position at Shaqif al-Naml and Haddatha and its outskirts with 120-mm mortar shells and heavy machine-gun fire.

At intervals between 1030 and 1210 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several direct-fire rounds and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at Jabal al-Rafi', the area around Sujud hill, areas along the Tasah spring and outlying areas of Arabsalim and Habbush from the Ayshiyah, Zafatah and Suwayda positions.

Between 1130 and 1250 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Western Bekaa and the Shuf at various altitudes.

Between 1240 and 1320 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at various altitudes.

At 1345 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Zwayya hill position.

Between 1220 and 1525 hours occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Zibqin from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1710 hours occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 1730 and 1900 hours a balloon was seen over Markaba.

Between 2000 and 2150 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired several 120-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at the easternmost neighbourhood of Kafr Tibnit from the Ali al-

Tahir hill, Burj hill and Zafatah positions. The electricity supply to the neighbourhood was cut off, three dwellings were hit by several rounds, an illumination flare fell on the roof of a dwelling, and a vehicle was damaged.

At 2200 hours a patrol of the collaborationist Lahad militia's security service arrested Hasan Khalil Tawil in Kafr Killa in the occupied strip for unknown reasons and took him to Khiyam prison.

22 October 1999

Between 0000 and 0400 hours a reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Tyre area at very high altitude.

Between 0500 and 0530 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 1330 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at the area around Sujud hill from the Shurayfah position.

Between 1615 and 1620 hours the collaborators' militia fired three tank shells at Jabal Shwayya from the Shwayya position.

Between 1840 and 1850 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Jibal al-Butm, Haddatha, Tibnin and Bra'shit from the positions at Tall Ya'qub, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Shaqif al-Naml and Ruwaysat al-Jamus.

At 2100 hours occupying Israeli forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Zibqin from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 2145 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and the area around Dabshah hill from the Zafatah and Dabshah hill positions.

23 October 1999

During the afternoon the Lahad militia's security service arrested Ali Haydar Budayr in Kafr Killa for unknown reasons and took him to Khiyam prison.

At 0000 hours Israeli occupation forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired five 155-mm artillery shells and three direct-fire rounds at outlying areas of Zibqin and Izziyah from the Tall Ya'qub, Shihin and Rajmin positions.

Between 0410 and 0530 hours occupation forces and the Lahad militia collaborating with them fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Rshaf, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Tibnin and Bayt Yahun from the positions at Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Rshaf, Ruwaysat al-Jamus and Haddatha.

Between 0505 and 0520 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. At 0515 hours they attacked Jabal al-Za'tar, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

At 0615 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0700 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal al-Rafi', outlying areas of Jba' and Wadi Kafra from the Zafatah position. The proxy militia and occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin, Kafra, Haddatha and Ayta al-Jabal from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and Tall Ya'qub.

At 0845 hours the proxy militia fired seven 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haddatha and Haris from the Ruways position.

Between 1335 and 1440 hours Israeli occupation forces fired four 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 1940 and 2010 hours Israeli occupation forces fired two 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At various times between 1940 and 2215 hours Israeli occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haddatha, Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Jabal al-Rafi' and at areas around Luwayzah, Sujud hill and Dabshah hill.

24 October 1999

At 0000 hours the proxy militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haris, Sribbin and Haddatha from the Ruways position.

Between 0000 and 0500 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Mansuri and Rashidiyah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 0030 and 0600 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Yatar, Haris, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Shaqra and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Saff al-Hawwa', Shal'abun hill and the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 0200 hours occupying Israeli forces fired three 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Muqawamah from Ahmadiyah hill.

At 0635 hours Israeli occupation forces fired two 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from the same position.

Between 0645 and 0730 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired 20 155-mm artillery shells and five 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha, Bayt Yahun, Sribbin, Tibnin and Bra'shit and at Wadi

al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Saff al-Hawwa' and the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 0915 hours an Israeli gunboat off Bayyadah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0915 hours occupying Israeli forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at Mlita hill, areas along the Tasah spring and the area around Sujud hill from the Shurayfah hill, Ksarat al-Urush and Sujud hill positions.

At 0920 hours occupation forces fired two 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from Ahmadiyah hill.

At 1015 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Jabal Bir al-Dahr at very high altitudes.

Between 1015 and 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. At 1035 hours they attacked Mlita hill, firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1855 hours occupation forces fired five 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Jabbur from Ahmadiyah hill.

At 1820 hours the collaborators' militia fired two 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Bra'shit from the Bayt Yahun position.

25 October 1999

At 0000 hours the Lahad proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at Wadi al-Munawwar from the Zafatah position. At the same time, occupation forces fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Mlita hill from the Ksarat al-Urush position.

Between 0410 and 0500 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Bayyadah and Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0550 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Frun and areas around Qusayr and Sala'ah from the Qusayr position.

Between 0625 and 0700 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Izziyah and mansuri, at the outskirts of Khirbat Silm and at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Tall Ya'qub, Shama', the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint and Sala'ah.

At 1220 hours Israeli occupation forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at areas around the Jabal Balat position from the Tall Ya'qub position.

At 1835 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri launched two illumination flares over the beach.

Between 2230 and 2300 hours occupation forces fired eight 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Siddiqin from the Tall Ya'qub position.

26 October 1999

Between 0000 and 0630 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Tibnin and Bra'shit from the position at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

Between 0640 and 0720 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at the southernmost neighbourhood of Arabsalim from the Shurayfah and Zafatah positions. A 120-mm mortar shell impacted in front of the home of Jawad Muhammad Musa, and he and his mother, Maryam, his wife, Muna, and his daughter, Afifah, received moderate injuries. A dwelling was badly damaged, an a vehicle, belonging to Faysal Husayn Farhat, was hit by shrapnel.

Between 0810 and 0920 hours an Israeli gunboat off Mansuri fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 0905 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired three 155-mm artillery shells, three direct-fire rounds and four 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Zibqin and Jibal al-Butm from the Tall Ya'qub, Shama' and Hardhun positions.

At 1600 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Rafi' and the area around Sujud hill from the Rayhan and Ksarat al-Urush positions.

At 1620 and 1730 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Mayfadun and Qa'qa'iyat al-Jisr from the Shurayfah and Zafatah positions.

Between 1950 and 2150 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Rshaf, Kafra, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Haris, Tibnin and Bra'shit from the positions at Haddatha, Rshaf, the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Ba'lul hill and Shal'abun hill. Two members of the Resistance were wounded.

Between 2115 and 2200 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the South at very high altitude.

At 2140 hours occupation forces at the Abu Qamhah position fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal al-Rafi' and at the area around the position itself.

At 2110 and 2145 hours occupation forces fired 12 155-mm artillery shells at an area to the north of Jabal Qal'at Jabbur from the Abu Qamhah position.

Between 2325 and 2340 hours occupying Israeli forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Majdal Zun from the Tall Ya'qub position.

During the evening a patrol of the collaborationist militia's security service arrested Muhsin Khalil Sulayman in Kafr Killa in the occupied strip and took him to Khiyam prison.

27 October 1999

Between 0635 and 0710 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah and Jibal al-Butm, at areas around Dabshah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill and at areas along the Zahrani River from the Zafatah, Tall Ya'qub, Dabshah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions. A shop in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa was hit by one round.

Between 0720 and 0800 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the wadi between Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah and Jibal al-Butm, firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1200 hours a patrol of the proxy militia's security service arrested Ahmad Muhammad Abd Allah for unknown reasons and took him to the Hasbayya security office.

Between 1805 and 1825 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired three 81-mm mortar shells and three 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Rshaf and Tiri from the Tall Ya'qub, Shaqif al-Naml and Ruways positions.

Between 1830 and 1900 hours the collaborators' militia and Israeli occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Jba' and at Jabal Safi from the Zafatah, Ksarat al-Urush, Razlan hill, Sujud hill and Aramta positions. Two direct-fire rounds coming from the collaborationist militia's Razlan hill position impacted in the vicinity of Ruh, one of them some 100 metres from the town cemeteries and the other at a point towards Sfariyah.

At 1900 hours the collaborators' militia fired an 81-mm mortar shell at a nearby area from the Ba'lul hill position.

Between 1940 and 2120 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Kharrub area and the South. They attacked outlying areas of Jba' in three waves and the area around Sujud hill in two waves, firing five air-to-surface missiles.

Between 2100 and 2125 hours the collaborators' militia fired five 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha from the Shal'abun hill position.

Between 2220 and 2230 hours occupation forces fired two shells from their position at Ahmadiyah hill.

At 2240 hours Israeli occupation forces fired seven 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah and Majdal Zun from the Tall Ya'qub position.

Between 2250 and 2300 hours occupation forces and the Lahad proxy militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Safi and outlying areas of Jba' from the Ksarat al-Urush and Rayhan positions.

At 2300 hours Israeli occupation forces fired five 120-mm mortar shells and four 155-mm artillery shells at Jabal Jabbur from Ahmadiyah hill.

28 October 1999

Between 0100 and 0630 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas Haddatha, Haris, Ayta al-Jabal, Shaqra and Bra'shit and at Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint, Ba'lul hill, Saff al-Hawwa', Shaqif al-Naml and Ruways.

Between 0950 and 1000 hours an Israeli gunboat off the coast between Bayyadah and Qulaylah fired several bursts of miscellaneous-weapons fire in all directions.

Between 1130 and 1325 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired several 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells at areas along the Tasah spring, areas around Sujud hill and Tahrah hill and Jabal al-Rafi' from the Rayhan, Ksarat al-Urush and Zafatah positions.

Between 1810 and 1835 hours the collaborators' militia fired five 81-mm and 120-mm mortar shells and two direct-fire rounds and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Buyut al-Siyad, Mansuri and Majdal Zun from the positions at Hardhun hill, Bayyadah and the Hamra crossing.

Between 1950 and 2245 hours occupying Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm, Haris, Haddatha, Bra'shit, Tibnin, Zibqin, Majdal Zun and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Tall Ya'qub and the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint.

At 2000 hours occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells at the outskirts of Jarju', areas along the Tasah spring, the area around Sujud hill and Jabal al-Rafi' from the Shurayfah position.

Between 2000 and 2030 hours occupation forces fired 15 120-mm mortar shells at an area to the west of Jabal Jabbur from Shurayfah hill.

29 October 1999

Between 1000 and 1120 hours occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells, 120-mm mortar shells and direct-fire rounds and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Izziyah, Mansuri, Buyut al-Siyad, Jarju', Luwayzah and Mazra'at Uqmata, at areas along the Tasah spring and at the area around Sujud

hill from the positions at Sujud hill, Hardhun hill, Bayyadah hill, the Hamra crossing, Shurayfah hill, Zafatah and Rayhan. At the Hamra crossing five civilians were injured, namely: Ali Hasan Rahmah; Muhsin Yusuf al-Sayyid Ahmad; Georges Fayiz Za'rab; Ali Musa Jamil; and Hasan Bajuq.

Between 1005 and 1300 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Western Bekaa and Mount Lebanon at various altitudes. At 1210 hours they attacked Mazra'at Uqmata, firing an air-to-surface missile.

At 1100 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the area around the Rayhan crossing from the Zwayya hill position.

Between 1200 and 1415 hours Israeli occupation forces and the collaborators' militia fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha, areas along the Tasah spring, Jabal al-Rafi' and the area around Sujud hill from the Shurayfah, Zafatah and Ruways positions.

Between 1450 and 1515 hours Israeli occupation forces fired eight 120-mm mortar shells at Wadi al-Sindiyanah from the Ahmadiyah hill position. At 1518 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the same wadi, firing an air-to-surface missile.

Between 1515 and 1610 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South. At 1535 hours they attacked areas along the Tasah spring, firing an air-to-surface missile.

Between 1900 and 2045 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Jba', the area around Sujud hill, areas along the Tasah spring and Wadi al-Qaysiyah from the positions at Zafatah, Rayhan, Shurayfah and the Mays al-Jabal checkpoint. Two direct-fire rounds were also fired from Sujud hill at unidentified targets.

Between 2120 and 2205 hours Israeli occupation forces directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Jabal Bir al-Dahr, the Mimis ridge and Wadi al-Fatir from the Zaghlah and Zwayya positions.

Between 2120 and 2300 hours Israeli occupation forces fired three 155-mm artillery shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and areas around the castle from the positions at Tall Ya'qub and Qal'at al-Shaqif (Château de Beaufort).

30 October 1999

During the morning an occupation forces' patrol found explosive charges that had been planted near two shops belonging to Ilyas al-Ammar on the Ayn Ibl - Bint Jubayl road. They blocked the road, detonated the charges and blew up the shops.

Between 0530 and 0600 hours occupation forces directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at Wadi al-Fatir and Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Zimriya and Zaghlah positions. They also fired two 120-mm mortar shells at Jabal Bir al-Dahr from the Abu Qamhah position.

Between 0550 and 0630 hours the collaborators' militia fired two 81-mm mortar shells and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Haddatha from the Shaqif al-Naml position.

Between 0600 and 0700 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South at very high altitudes.

Between 1250 and 1400 hours occupation forces and the proxy militia fired 12 155-mm artillery shells and five 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Rshaf, Haddatha and Yatar from the Tall Ya'qub and Ruways positions.

At 1120 hours the Israel Navy stopped a tourist craft under a Lebanese master off Naqurah with 72 persons on board, none of them Lebanese nationals.

At 1700 hours the collaborators' militia fired several 120-mm mortar shells and directed bursts of medium-weapons fire at Jabal al-Rafi' and areas along the Tasah spring from the Suwayda hill and Rayhan positions.

Between 1800 and 1840 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Mount Lebanon and the South. At 1820 and 1840 hours they attacked areas along the Tasah spring in two waves, firing two air-to-surface missiles.

At 2145 hours occupation forces at Dabshah hill fired several 81-mm mortar shells and directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at areas around their position.

At 1700 hours the collaborators' militia arrested Talal Jurays Khalil in Rashayya al-Fukhkhar, Hasbayya district, for unknown reasons and took him to Khiyam prison.

During the day the Lahad proxy militia and occupation forces arrested the student Muhammad Ya'qub Surur in Ayta al-Sha'b and took him to the occupation forces' post 17. The young man's father had been arrested on 28 October.

31 October 1999

At 1740 hours the collaborators' militia and occupation forces directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah and at outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and Kafr Tibnit from the Dabshah hill and Ali al-Tahir hill positions.

Between 1745 and 1755 hours the collaborators' militia fired two 120-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire at outlying areas of Majdal Zun from the Shaqif al-Naml and Shama' positions.

Between 1830 and 1840 hours the Lahad militia collaborating with Israel fired several 81-mm mortar shells at outlying areas of Haddatha and Ayta al-Jabal from the Shaqif al-Naml and Ruwaysat al-Jamus positions.

Between 2105 and 2130 hours the collaborators' militia directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire and fired an 81-mm mortar shell at Jabal Shwayya and Jabal al-Khalawat from the Shwayya hill position.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation and the fresh attacks and arbitrary practices against the Lebanese civilian population that have left a number of wounded and have caused further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sélim TADMOURY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative